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Although there is agreement on the basic economic principles that should apply to 
monopolization cases, there is no widely accepted paradigm for market definition or the 
identification of market power in such cases.  This contrasts with the SSNIP paradigm of the DOJ-
FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which has gained wide acceptance in the two decades since its 
introduction.  Moreover, misguided notions of market definition in monopolization cases still fall 
into a repeat commission of the “cellophane fallacy” of U.S. v. du Pont (1956). 
To correct this problem, we propose asking the following question in monopolization cases 
where exclusionary practices are alleged:  Would preservation of the allegedly foreclosed 
competitor or group of competitors have led to a small but significant nontransitory decrease in 
price (SSNDP) by the defendant?  This SSNDP test can help define the relevant market and, more 
importantly, can allow courts to focus directly on the anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s 
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Private and government-sponsored antitrust cases that allege monopolization require 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defendant has market power.1  It is conventional to 
determine whether a defendant has market power2 by pursuing a series of subsidiary 
questions: (1) What is the relevant market in which the defendant sells?  (2) What is the 
                                                 
     * The authors would like to thank Timothy Brennan, Luis Cabral, Stephen Calkins, Dale Collins, William 
Comanor, Franklin Fisher, Stuart Gurrea, Henry McFarland, Janusz Ordover, Renee Redman, David Round, 
Steven Salop, David Smith, Robert Steiner, Su Sun, Michael Weiner, Gregory Werden, the members of the 
Committee on Antitrust and Trade Practices of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and 
participants at seminars at the International Industrial Organization Conference, at CUNY, and at the Stern 
School of Business for their valuable comments on early formulations of the ideas embodied in this paper. 
1 Landes and Posner argue: “A finding of monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
requires an initial determination that the defendant has monopoly power -- a high degree of market power.  
A lesser but still significant market power requirement is imposed in attempted monopolization cases under 
Section 2.  There is increasing authority that proof of market power is also required in Rule of Reason cases 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Issues of market power arise even in cases involving per se rules of 
illegality.  Proof of some market power (though perhaps little) is required in a tie-in case; and in a private 
price-fixing case, proof of effect on prices (i.e., proof of the exercise of market power), while unnecessary 
to establish liability, is necessary to establish damages.” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner Market 
Power In Antitrust Cases 94 HARV. L. R. 937, 937-938 (1981). 
2 Throughout this essay we will use the terms “market power,” “monopoly power,” and “monopoly” more-or-
less interchangeably, though we recognize that “monopoly” technically refers to a single seller that sells a 
distinct product and faces a downward sloping demand curve, as is portrayed in Figure 1, infra Section II.  In 
addition, we recognize that monopolization and other antitrust laws have been interpreted to require firms to 
have substantial amounts of market power.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 1 (stating that monopoly power 
involves “a high degree of market power.”); Phillip Areeda, Hebert Hovenkamp, and John Solow, 
ANTITRUST LAW (1995) (emphasizing that antitrust case law requires “monopoly power” to be 
“substantial.”); George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 808 (1992) (discussing the 
level of market power). 
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defendant's market share in that market?  (3) Does the defendant's market share, when 
combined with other market characteristics (such as entry conditions), indicate that the 
defendant has market power?3  Because the definition of market is the starting point for this 
series of questions, the determination of the relevant market is crucial to the outcome of 
most, if not all, cases. 
Unfortunately, while there is substantial agreement about fundamental economic 
relationships, such as the cross-elasticity of demand between products, that shape the 
contours of relevant antitrust markets, there is no standard paradigm for market definition in 
monopolization cases.4  This differs sharply from the situation that applies to merger cases, 
where the market definition paradigm that is embodied in the DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines is now a well-accepted methodology. 
Historically, there was some attempt to use profit data (with little else in the way of 
supporting evidence) to identify market power and, often indirectly, to define the relevant 
market.  However, this approach has proved to be too simplistic and susceptible to error.  
For example, as was pointed out in a set of articles two decades ago, the accounting data that 
were typically used to measure profits often were not accurate measures of the economic 
profits that can be generated by market power. 
                                                 
3 While this approach is conventional, there are cases where one can proceed without measuring market 
shares because other indicia of competitive position are more appropriate.  For example, in developing 
markets, it may be more appropriate to look at the technical capabilities of the firms that are developing the 
technologies.  In addition, it is important to recognize that even if the plaintiff demonstrates that the 
defendant has market power, the case does not stop there, of course.  The plaintiff must then prove that the 
defendant used its market power in an anticompetitive way and without sufficient offsetting benefits.  
Nevertheless, the market definition step is typically a crucial initial hurdle for the plaintiff and a crucial 
initial defending point for the defendant. 
4 This absence has been noted before.  See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, & Steven Salop, 
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO L. REV. 241 (1987); Lawrence J. White, 
Wanted: A New Market Definition Paradigm for Monopolization Cases, COMP. IND (1999); Lawrence J. White, 
Present at the Beginning of a New Era for Antitrust: Reflections on 1982-1983, 16 REV. IND. ORGANIZATION 
131 (2000); Lawrence J. White, An Appraisal of Antitrust Policy during the Clinton Administration, in Robert 
W. Hahn, ed., HIGH-STAKES ANTITRUST: THE LAST HURRAH? 11 (2003). 
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Given the widespread acceptance of the Merger Guidelines approach to market 
definition in merger cases, one might think that it would be relatively straightforward to 
transfer this concept to the problem of defining markets in monopolization cases.  However, 
this is not the case.  Except for a few special instances, that paradigm cannot be applied 
without modification to monopolization cases.  Indeed, its direct application (when a firm is 
actually exploiting market power) is likely to lead to the improper definition of relevant 
markets because of the “cellophane fallacy.” 
In this paper we propose a new approach.  This approach uses some of the concepts 
underlying the Merger Guidelines paradigm.  However, instead of trying to define a market 
explicitly, our approach proceeds more directly to focus on the identification of the presence 
or absence of the anticompetitive effects of a defendant's behavior.  In so doing, our 
approach explicitly identifies the presence of market power in conjunction with 
anticompetitive effects and reaches some implicit conclusions about market boundaries, but 
does not require explicit delineation of these boundaries.  In essence, our approach focuses 
more directly on the presence or absence of the anticompetitive effects of a defendant's 
behavior, rather than focusing on demand-side substitution at current prices that is 
commonly used when applying the Merger Guidelines.5  Moreover, while our approach can 
be adapted to support existing legal approaches that have typically required the definition of 
a relevant market, it also produces evidence that may allow courts and economists to 
sidestep this step in the analysis by allowing the more direct identification of the exercise of 
market power. 
                                                 
5 Most mergers are analyzed at current prices.  However (arguably, because of a potential “cellophane”-like 
problem, the Guidelines provide for the analysis at other prices if the current prices are believed to differ 
from competitive prices: “[T]he Agency will use prevailing prices of the products of the merging firms and 
possible substitutes for such products, unless premerger circumstances are strongly suggestive of 
coordinated interaction, in which case the Agency will use a price more reflective of the competitive price.” 
Merger Guidelines, §1.11. 
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Briefly, we propose asking the following “counter-factual” question in 
monopolization cases where exclusionary practices are alleged:  “Would the preservation of 
the allegedly foreclosed competitor or group of competitors have led to a small but 
significant nontransitory decrease in price (SSNDP) by the defendant?”  If so, then the 
defendant likely possesses market power, and the defendant’s actions are likely to have had 
an anticompetitive effect (and, implicitly, there is a relevant market that includes the 
defendant, and possibly other firms, in which the defendant could and did exercise market 
power).  If not, then the defendant’s actions were not anticompetitive (implicitly, because 
the relevant market is sufficiently large so that the [counter-factual] presence of the non-
foreclosed plaintiff would not have made a significant difference).6
 The remainder of this paper will expand upon these ideas.  In Section II we 
reproduce the standard economics concept of monopoly.  One of our important points is to 
emphasize the static nature of the monopoly model -- that the monopolist maintains prices 
that are above competitive levels -- and that the concept of a monopolist’s raising its price is 
misleading, since raising the price applies only to a transition from a competitive market 
structure to a monopoly structure (or where a monopolist perceives a change in market 
conditions).  Nevertheless, loose language by some economists (as well as non-economists) 
that links monopoly power with raising prices has led to unnecessary confusion and even 
error, including the repeating of the "cellophane fallacy."  In Section III we discuss the 
“cellophane fallacy” itself at greater length, since it lies at the center of much misguided 
thinking about market definition for monopolization cases.  In Section IV we discuss the 
Merger Guidelines paradigm for market definition, since it provides an example of a 
successful paradigm (for merger analysis), but also one that has sometimes been misused for 
                                                 
6 After we developed our proposed SSNDP test, it was suggested to us that our test is the same as the 
suggestions found in Krattenmaker, Lande, & Salop at 257, supra note 4.  Though we acknowledge the 
similarity of approach, we believe that our development of the two-stage “but for” process considerably 
clarifies the nature of the question being asked and the nature of the test to be applied. 
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monopolization cases (leading, again, to the "cellophane fallacy").  In Section V we propose 
and elaborate on our SSNDP test for anticompetitive effects in monopolization cases.  And 
Section VI provides a conclusion. 
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II. Monopoly (Market Power)
 
Figure 1 presents a standard diagram that portrays the profit-maximizing outcome 
for a non-discriminating monopoly.  The monopolist is selling a unique item, as is indicated 
by the demand curve that has a negative slope:  At lower prices the monopolist would be 
able to sell more of the item (per unit of time); at higher prices the monopolist would be able 
to sell fewer units of the item.  With marginal costs as indicated, the maximizing outcome 
for the monopolist is point y (representing the monopoly price and quantity, PM and QM, 
respectively).7
Point x represents the competitive price and quantity (PC and QC, respectively) that 
would prevail if the same demand curve were served by a group of sellers that were each 
price takers, that could easily enter and/or exit the industry, and that had cost structures such 
that the group's long-run supply curve was identical to the monopolist's marginal cost curve. 
Monopoly point y represents an outcome where the price is higher and the quantity 
is lower than for the competitive point x.  The social loss from the monopoly is the 
deadweight loss triangle, although the transfer of consumers’ surplus from buyers to the 
monopolist clearly weighs importantly in the political support for antitrust policy. 
One crucial aspect of the diagram and the monopoly outcome that it represents is 
that it is static.  The maximizing outcome is one at which the monopolist maintains a price 
level that is higher than the competitive level.  Thus, if we could observe a monopolist “at 
work,” we should observe a high price (relative to the competitive price) and high profits or 
rents (relative to the competitive rate of return).  Holding costs and other relevant variables 
constant, we should not observe the monopolist raising its price, except if we observed the 
firm being transformed from the competitive structure of point x to the monopoly seller of 
                                                 
 7 Also, as all texts point out, the monopoly outcome occurs at the quantity at which marginal revenue (MR) 
equals marginal cost (MC).  And the maximizing outcome can also be represented as PM = MC/(1+1/E), where 
PM is the monopolist’s profit maximizing price and E is the price elasticity of demand at that price. 
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point y.8  But rare is the instance where this transformation can be observed.  Instead, most 
monopolization cases involve the allegations that a firm that already has market power has 
used or is using that position to exclude rivals and thereby enhance its power.9  Thus, the 
question of whether the accused firm already has market power has to be determined from 
observed levels, not from an observed transformation or movement from point x to point y.  
And just the observation of the seller's price alone at a particular point in time, without a 
basis for comparison, is not enough to indicate whether that price is consistent with point y 
or point x. 
A second aspect of the outcome follows logically from the maximization concept 
that determines point y:  The monopolist would find a price increase above PM to be 
unprofitable, because its quantity would decline by too much -- i.e., it would lose too many 
sales.10
A third aspect flows from this last point.  If we observe the monopolist at its 
maximizing outcome, then we will observe it losing some sales to other sellers of 
“something.”  Indeed, this competition at the margin is explicit in “dominant firm” models, 
where a “competitive fringe” of smaller firms (which are constrained in their expansion 
possibilities by production technology limitations or brand name/reputation limitations) 
limits but does not eliminate the market power of the larger (dominant) firm.11
Virtually all professionally trained economists understand and would agree with the 
preceding discussion.  Unfortunately, some prominent economists' writings, especially in 
                                                 
8 Similarly, we might observe the demand curve facing the monopolist becoming less elastic.  This reduced 
elasticity could arise as a consequence of the monopolist's exclusionary actions vis-à-vis the plaintiff.  But, 
unless we can observe the "before" as well as the “after” outcomes, we would not be able to observe the raising 
of the monopolist’s price. 
9 Krattenmaker, Lande, & Salop, supra note 4, raise the possibility that a previously competitive firm may find 
a means to exclude rivals and thereby achieve market power.  We discuss this possibility in Section V infra. 
10 This point is at the heart of the “cellophane fallacy,” which is discussed in Section III infra. 
11 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Price Umbrella, 8 J. L. ECON. 167 (1965). 
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connection with monopolization cases, have tended to muddy these points, by using the 
word “raise” rather than “maintain” and thus possibly suggesting to those less well versed in 
microeconomics the idea that the hallmark of market power is the (unexercised?) ability to 
“raise” prices from observed levels and that the apparent inability or unwillingness of an 
enterprise to “raise” its prices from observed levels implies that it does not have market 
power.  Consider the following: 
 
“It is the ability of a firm to raise prices or market inferior products while excluding 
competition that constitutes monopoly power.”12 [seeming to suggest that the 
inability of an observed firm to raise its price profitably from observed levels implies 
that the firm does not possess market power] 
 
“Monopoly power is by definition the ability to control (that is to raise) prices 
without inducing entry and expansion.”13 [seeming to suggest that the inability of an 
observed firm to raise its price profitably from observed levels implies that the firm 
does not possess market power] 
 
“... substantial evidence was introduced at trial that [original equipment 
manufacturers of personal computers] would not shift to another operating system, 
even if the price of Windows rose significantly.”14 [which suggests, contrary to other 
arguments that they make, that Microsoft was charging prices below the 
monopolistic level] 
 
“Economists usually define market power as the power to raise price above 
competitive levels.”15 [seeming to suggest that the inability of an observed firm to 
raise its price profitably from observed levels implies that the firm does not possess 
market power] 
 Further, major (and often cited) legal opinions in monopolization cases have 
employed similarly muddying language: 
                                                 
12 Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan, & Joen E. Greenwood, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. V. IBM 99 (1983). 
13 Id., 165. 
14 Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, U.S. v. Microsoft: An Economic Analysis, in David S. Evans et al., 
DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS? TWO OPPOSING  VIEWS 13 (2000). 
15 David S. Evans & Richard L. Schmalensee, Be Nice to Your Rivals: How the Government is Selling an 
Antitrust Case without Consumer Harm in United States v. Microsoft, in Evans et al., DID MICROSOFT 
HARM CONSUMERS? TWO OPPOSING VIEWS 65 (2000). 
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“Market power is usually stated to be the ability of a single seller to raise price and 
restrict output...”16 [seeming to suggest that the inability of an observed firm to raise 
its price profitably from observed levels implies that the firm does not possess 
market power] 
 
“Market power comes from the ability to cut back the market's total output and so 
raise price.”17 [seeming to suggest that the inability of an observed firm to raise its 
price profitably from observed levels implies that the firm does not possess market 
power] 
 
“…a firm is a monopolist if it can profitably raise prices substantially above the 
competitive level.”18 [seeming to suggest that the inability of an observed firm to 
raise its price profitably from observed levels implies that the firm does not possess 
market power]  
 
In these cases the economists and courts may have implicitly had in mind a 
comparative statics analysis that contrasts the pricing at a monopolistic equilibrium to that at 
a competitive equilibrium, since this is the comparison that is provided in most introductory 
microeconomic theory textbooks.19  However, the wording nonetheless could mislead others 
who do not have this fundamental paradigm in mind.  Moreover, the comparative statics 
analysis that may have been intended requires information about the competitive price and 
quantity, which is usually not directly observable if a firm or group of firms is currently 
monopolizing. 
                                                 
 16 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503. 
17 Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (1986). 
18 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 22 (2001). 
19 Some, if not all, of the authors of these quotes are likely to agree that, in the context of a monopolization 
case, using the test of raising prices above the current level is wrong (whatever its value in merger cases) 
and that they intended to advocate a standard that involves testing whether the firm has the ability to raise 
prices above "the competitive level."  See, for example, Franklin M. Fisher, Market Definition: A User's 
Guide, in Finnish Competition Authority, Workshop on Market Definition: Compilation of Papers 
(2002).  However, this position still leaves unexplained how to determine "the competitive level" when one 
can only observe the current price. 
 
 9
 Again, our major point here is fundamental, simple, and worth repeating:  The 
observation that a firm cannot profitably raise its price from observed levels is insufficient 
to provide us with the basis for concluding that the firm does not possess market power. 
So, how can we distinguish between a firm that is a monopolist and one that is a 
competitor?  There are two questions -- and possibly a third -- that might seem to offer help 
in distinguishing between a monopolist and a competitor but that in fact will not offer help 
in distinguishing between the two.  The first is, "Can an observed firm profitably raise its 
prices for a sustained period of time?”  Both the monopolist and the competitor should 
truthfully respond “No.”20  The second is, "Does this firm face competition (at the margin) 
at its current price?"  Both parties can truthfully respond “Yes.”  The third is, “Does entry 
play a disciplining role?”  For both competitive and monopolistic markets, the answer may 
be either “Yes” or “No.”  While competitive markets often have low barriers to entry, 
markets with high barriers to entry may be competitive if there are sufficient numbers of 
incumbent competitors.  Similarly, while monopolistic markets may be insulated by high 
barriers to entry and prices may be constrained solely by demand-side substitution, prices 
may also be constrained by supply-side substitution (or potential entry) because the 
monopolist limits prices (as is portrayed in, e.g., the dominant firm model discussed 
above).21
A fourth question would seem to offer more help: “What is the price-elasticity of 
demand for the product that the firm sells?”  The monopolist should respond with an 
                                                 
20 While both monopolists and competitors may be able to raise prices for a short period and increase 
profits over that period, this strategy may not be sustainable over the long run because entry or other 
structural changes may make it unprofitable.  As a result, sustainability of the elevated price is a key 
characteristic of monopoly power. 
21 Stigler, supra note 11; see also Joe S. Bain, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).  Also, entry into 
a specific competitive industry might be difficult, but the number of incumbents and their elasticities of supply 
might both be sufficiently high, so that the absence of easy entry would not substantially affect the competitive 
outcome.  In this case, we might get the perverse result that a competitive firm might answer “No,” while a 
monopolist could answer “Yes.” 
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elasticity that is finite and that satisfies the condition expressed in note 7 supra;22 a “perfect” 
competitor, who produces a commodity that is identical to the product sold by its rivals and 
who acts as a price-taker, should perceive an elasticity of demand that is near infinite. 
However, although the homogeneous commodity world of the perfect competitor is 
a useful abstraction for highlighting fundamental points of microeconomic theory, most 
firms produce distinct products or services, for which they face demand curves that are 
substantially less than infinitely elastic.23  But, as Chamberlin and Robinson recognized, 
even distinctive sellers may earn only competitive profit levels if entry by somewhat similar 
sellers is easy.24  Further, the social loss from “monopoly” and the transfer from buyers to 
the seller that is associated with monopoly are absent from the Chamberlin/Robinson 
(“C/R”) model.25  The equilibrium in this C/R entry model is portrayed for an individual 
seller in Figure 2, where entry and exit drive the only stable outcome: the tangency of the 
sloped demand curve that the firm perceives with its average cost curve, yielding a price of 
PC/R and a quantity QC/R. 
                                                 
22 Simple textbook models of monopolistic pricing indicate that monopolists will not operate on the 
inelastic portion of their demand curves since higher profits are available at higher prices where the 
demand is sufficiently elastic so as to make yet higher prices less profitable; see the formula in footnote 7 
supra.  However, one must consider the extent to which long-term demand is more elastic than short-term 
demand, since monopolists may find it profitable to constrain prices to the inelastic portion of a short-term 
demand curve to deter substitution that would occur over the long run if higher prices were charge. 
23  Put slightly differently, the demand curves of differentiated products may be “downward sloping.” 
24 Chamberlin described this as “monopolistic competition”; Robinson described it as “imperfect competition.”  
See Edward H. Chamberlin, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, 7th edn. (1956); and Joan 
Robinson, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). 
25 There may still be a social loss from excessive variety or even inadequate variety, but this result is subtle and 
not directly related to any exercise of market power.  As Spence and Dixit & Stiglitz separately demonstrated, if 
one takes the distinctiveness of the sellers’ products as exogenous, then the inefficiency relates to the inability 
of the sellers to achieve the lower costs that would accompany greater production volumes (if there were fewer 
varieties being sold) versus the gains from greater varieties of products and services that better match some 
buyers’ preferences.  These competing arguments could imply either that there are too many varieties being 
sold, or there are too few.  But market power is not a meaningful culprit in either scenario.  See A. Michael 
Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976); and 
Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. 
ECON. REV. 797 (1977). 
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So, if both a socially inefficient monopolist and a C/R competitor can experience 
demand elasticities that are finite, then both can respond to the fourth question similarly.  
Again, it will be difficult to tell them apart. 
A fifth question would seem to be definitive: “What are your profit levels (i.e., rates 
of return on invested capital)?”  The monopolist earns above-normal profits; the C/R 
competitor earns only normal profits.  And prior to the 1980s, profit data were an important 
part of prosecutors’/plaintiffs’ cases against alleged monopolizers.26  While economists have 
long recognized that one must be careful when using accounting data to analyze market 
power,27 this concern has increased over time.28  Moreover, it has been pointed out that 
firms that have market power may not earn supranormal economic profits if they expend 
these profits on costly efforts to insulate themselves from competition29 or if the 
monopolistic firms undertake unprofitable expenditures.30  Although profitability data 
                                                 
26 Further, some economists have suggested that the definition of “antitrust monopoly power” should 
include the requirement that the firm or group of firms that is alleged to have market power is earning 
“supranormal economic profits.” See Hay, supra note 2 at 814.   
27 As Bain pointed out: “The unadjusted accounting rate of profit, as computed by the usual methods from 
balance sheets and income statements, is prima facie an absolutely unreliable indicator of the presence or 
absence either of monopoly power or excess profits in the sense defined.” Joe S. Bain, The Profit Rate as a 
Measure of Monopoly Power, 55 Q. J. ECON. 291 (1941).   
28 Two key articles that criticized the use of accounting data are: George J. Benston, Accounting Numbers and 
Economic Values, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 161 (1982); and Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On the 
Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 82 (1983).  For 
example, Fisher and McGowan wrote: “there is no way in which one can look at accounting rates of return 
and infer anything about relative economic profitability or, a fortiori, about the presence or absence of 
monopoly profits.”  Nonetheless, others have responded, arguing that there is “substantial evidence that 
accounting profits do, on average, yield important insights into economic performance.” William F. Long 
& David J. Ravenscraft, The Usefulness of Accounting Profit Data: A Comment on Fisher and McGowan, 
74 AM. ECON. REV. 494 (1984).  For others who are also less critical of the use of accounting data see: 
Stephen Martin, The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: Comment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 501 (1984); 
John A. Kay & Colin P. Mayer, On Applications of Accounting Rates of Return, 96 ECON. J. 199 (1986); 
F.M. Scherer, The Validity of Studies with Line of Business Data: Comment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 205 
(1987). 
29 See e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulations, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975) 
(describing costly activities designed to secure profits). 
30 Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency’, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966). 
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have not been wholly absent from monopolization cases since then, profitability data have 
figured far less prominently in prosecutors’/plaintiffs’ cases (or, as is explained below, been 
used as part of a more sophisticated cross-sectional or time-series analysis of pricing 
behavior). 
Is there anything left, short of a thorough, multi-faceted market analysis that 
considers a variety of indicia?  In principle, a competitor’s prices should be responsive to 
and move closely with those of its rivals.  But, since the monopolist can face competition at 
the margin at observed prices, it too may be observed responding to the changes in prices of 
its “competitors.” 
For some industries where the relevant markets are (arguably) local (e.g., some 
banking products and services, airline city-pair routes, rail freight shipment point-to-point 
routes, many retail services), cross-sectional price data that is combined with market seller 
concentration data and other relevant data for local areas would permit statistical studies that 
could determine whether the markets are indeed local and whether market power is being 
exercised in some of them.31  But where markets are regional or national, so that there is 
insufficient cross-sectional variation to permit such statistical tests and inferences, this route 
will not be available. 
Also, where a market has been subject to structural change, such as the increased 
concentration of a market through merger, economists have sometimes used time-series data 
to test for changes in prices with changes in concentration.32  However, this requires 
                                                 
31 See the discussion of the Staples-Office Depot case in Section IV infra.  In essence, if there is sufficient cross-
sectional variation in seller concentration and other indicia of the presence or absence of market power, the 
multiple market observations allow us to observe cross-sectionally some of Figure 1's point x’s, as well as some 
point y’s, and thus provide the appropriate basis for comparison.  For a collection of such studies, see Leonard 
W. Weiss, CONCENTRATION AND PRICE (1989). 
32 See, e.g., David M. Barton & Roger Sherman, The Price and Profit Effects of Horizontal Merger: A Case 
Study, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 165 (1984).  This study looks at changes in firm profits due to a merger and 
attempts to distinguish variations due to efficiencies from those due to anticompetitive effects. 
 13
controlling for changes in costs that may affect profits over time.  Moreover, the acquisition 
of power may have been gradual and/or may have occurred a long time in the past. 
Thus, the sharp distinction between a monopolist and a competitor that is maintained 
in economic models and is embodied in Figure 1 can blur upon application to observed 
firms that are alleged to have market power.  Economists and courts can be left with 
distinctions based on gradations:  We expect a firm with significant market power to face 
demand elasticities that are smaller than those faced by competitors (perfect or CR) over at 
least some portion of the relevant price range; we expect a firm with significant market 
power to exhibit less price sensitivity to actual and potential rivals' prices over at least some 
portion of the relevant price range; we expect a monopolist to be less threatened by potential 
entry than are competitive firms; and we expect a monopolist's reported profits, albeit 
imperfectly represented by accounting data, to be persistently higher. 
Even if we accept that distinctions based on gradations are unavoidable, it still 
would be helpful to have a paradigm that ties together the market power analysis by 
providing a fundamental touchstone that can guide the multifaceted analysis.  In particular, it 
would be helpful to have a core principle that would allow us to determine whether a firm 
has “sufficient” market power to warrant a monopolization accusation and to help us 
delineate market boundaries that should be used in this determination. 
In the next Section we discuss a false route: the “cellophane fallacy.”  We follow in 
Section IV with a successful market definition paradigm for merger analysis: the DOJ-FTC 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  We will argue, however, that the market definition 
paradigm of the Merger Guidelines has only limited applicability to monopolization cases, 
and that the mis-application of that paradigm involves a re-commission of the “cellophane 
fallacy.” In Section V we will then offer our proposal. 
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III. The “Cellophane Fallacy”
 
On December 13, 1947, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) began a civil suit 
against E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., charging that du Pont had monopolized the 
manufacture and sale of cellophane in the U.S.  Six years later, a federal district court judge 
decided in favor of du Pont.33  The DOJ appealed to the Supreme Court, which accepted 
certiorari and decided the case in 1956.  The decision (by a 4-3 vote) again went in favor of 
du Pont.34
The crucial issue for the case, at both the district court and Supreme Court levels, 
was whether du Pont had market power.35  And, in turn, that issue hinged on market 
definition:  Was the relevant market cellophane, as the DOJ claimed, in which case du Pont 
was likely to have market power?36  Or was the relevant market “flexible wrapping 
materials,”37 as du Pont claimed, in which case du Pont did not have market power?38
Both the district court and the Supreme Court majority decided that the latter was the 
case.  Crucial to those conclusions were the district court's and the Supreme Court 
                                                 
33 U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (1953). 
34 U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
35 The Supreme Court did also consider whether, even if du Pont did possess market power, the company had 
abused that power, and the Court concluded that it had not.  But the major issue was that of the possession of 
market power. 
36 From the 1920s until 1951 there were only two sellers of cellophane in the U.S.: du Pont, and the Sylvania 
Industrial Corporation of America.  The latter firm sold its cellophane under an agreement with du Pont 
(reached in 1933, as the settlement to a patent infringement suit brought by du Pont) that included royalties 
(paid by Sylvania to du Pont) and that limited Sylvania's output.  From 1933 through 1950 du Pont supplied 
about 76% of the market, and Sylvania supplied 24%.  See George W. Stocking & Willard F. Mueller, The 
Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 29 (1955); and 118 F. Supp. 41, 116 (1953). 
37 “Flexible wrapping materials” included cellophane, kraft paper, waxed paper, aluminum foil, polyethylene, 
pliofilm, glassine, parchment, Saran, and cellulose acetate. 
38 Du Pont's share of the “flexible wrapping materials market” was less than 20%; specifically, it was 17.9% in 
1949.  See 118 F.Supp. 41, 111 (1953). 
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majority’s perceptions of a high cross-elasticity of demand between cellophane and other 
flexible wrapping materials.  The district court concluded: 
 
“Du Pont has no power to set cellophane prices arbitrarily.  If prices for cellophane 
increase in relation to prices of other flexible packaging materials it will lose 
business to manufactures of such materials in varying amounts for each of du Pont 
cellophane's major end uses.  Relative increases would make competition more 
difficult to obtain new business.”39
 
“Under market conditions which have prevailed, du Pont does not possess power to 
raise cellophane prices without regard for competitive pressures.  The market would 
penalize any attempt to do so with lower sales and smaller profits.”40
 
“Great sensitivity of customers in the flexible packaging markets to price or quality 
changes, in final analysis reflects the fact these customers have adequate alternatives 
to purchasing from du Pont.  Price sensitivity of these customers is a reason why du 
Pont's control over its prices is not such as to give it monopoly power.  Competitive 
influences in the flexible packaging markets place limitations upon du Pont's pricing 
policies and procedures.  They force reduction of du Pont's prices and deny it power 
to raise prices in the manner of a monopolist.”41
 
And the Supreme Court majority similarly found: 
 
“But despite cellophane’s advantages, it has to meet competition from other 
materials in every one of its uses.”42
 
“We conclude that cellophane's interchangeability with the other materials 
mentioned suffices to make it a part of this flexible packaging material market.”43
 
“... it seems to us that du Pont should not be found to monopolize cellophane when 
that product has the competition and interchangeability with other wrappings that 
this record shows.”44
                                                 
39 118 F. Supp. 41, 179 (1953). 
40 118 F. Supp. 41, 206 (1953). 
41 118 F. Supp. 41, 207 (1953). 
42 351 U.S. 377, 399 (1956). 
43 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956). 
44 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). 
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Note, however, that the district court and the Supreme Court majority were 
observing the cross-elasticities and the interchangeability of cellophane with other materials 
at the observed (maximizing) price that du Pont was charging.  It should come as no 
surprise that at that price, du Pont’s cellophane was “interchangeable” and “competitive” 
with other materials -- irrespective of whether du Pont had or did not have market power. 
Stocking and Mueller, in an article45 commenting on the district court’s decision, 
recognized this problem.  They argued that cellophane was the relevant market and that du 
Pont had market power, based on evidence that du Pont’s prices had moved independently 
of the prices of other flexible wrapping materials, and vice-versa, and that du Pont’s profits 
in cellophane were substantially higher than from its manufacture and sale of rayon,46 where 
it faced 15-18 other producers of the same item and where its market share (less than 20%) 
was about the same as its 17.9% “share” of the “flexible wrapping materials market.”47
 The “cellophane fallacy” is now a well-established phrase in the antitrust lexicon.  
Nevertheless, the temptation persists for some analysts to draw conclusions about market 
power (or its absence) by asking whether an observed firm could profitably raise its prices 
from observed levels. 
                                                 
45 Stocking & Mueller, supra note 36. 
46 Stocking & Mueller, supra note 36.  They drew on data found in Jesse W. Markham, COMPETITION IN THE 
RAYON INDUSTRY (1952). 
47 The Supreme Court's minority dissent in the case argued that cellophane was the relevant market and that du 
Pont should be found to have monopolized that market.  It quoted from the Mueller & Stocking article, supra 
note 35, and cited the independent pattern of pricing and the high profits.  But it did not quite embrace the point 
concerning a monopolist's facing competition at the margin.  See 351 U.S. 377, 414 (1956). 
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IV. The SSNIP Test for Prospective Mergers
 
For the past two decades the federal antitrust enforcement agencies have been using 
a specific paradigm for market definition in their analyses of prospective mergers.48  The 
DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines define a relevant market, for the purposes of 
assessing the potential anticompetitive nature of a prospective merger as follows: 
 
“Absent price discrimination, the Agency will delineate the product market 
to be a product or group of products such that a hypothetical profit-
maximizing firm that was the only present and future seller of those products 
(‘monopolist’) likely would impose at least a ‘small but significant and 
nontransitory’ increase in price.” 
 
This last phrase has come to be known as the “SSNIP” test.  A 5% price increase that can be 
sustained for one year is often used for the SSNIP test. 
In essence, the Merger Guidelines define a relevant market as one in which market 
power could be exercised or enhanced.  The subsequent provisions of the Merger Guidelines 
then develop the criteria for asking whether any specific proposed merger is likely to permit 
the merged firm (unilaterally or collectively with other firms in the market) to exercise 
market power that was not previously present (or enhance and strengthen any existing 
market power). 
The Merger Guidelines, and especially its market definition paradigm and the 
SSNIP test, have proved durable and successful in two decades of merger analyses.49  
                                                 
48 The market definition paradigm described below was first proposed by the DOJ in 1982, which immediately 
began using the paradigm for its merger analyses.  See White, “Present...,” supra note 4.  The Guidelines were 
modestly revised in 1984 and more substantially revised in 1992, when the FTC officially became a co-author 
(although the FTC had been using the Merger Guidelines paradigm from the mid 1980s onward; see, e.g., 
Lawrence J. White, Application of the Merger Guidelines: The Proposed Merger of Coca-Cola and Dr Pepper, 
in John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, eds., THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS, 
2nd edn., 76 (1994)).  They were modestly revised again in 1997.  They can be found at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm. 
49 For a recent collection of assessments of the applications of the Merger Guidelines, see Jonathan B. Baker, 
Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines, accessible at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11252.htm; William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines 
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Unfortunately, the SSNIP test cannot generally be applied to monopolization cases.  To ask 
whether the defendant could profitably increase its price by a “small but significant 
nontransitory” amount would run afoul of the “cellophane fallacy” discussed above.  Both a 
competitor and a monopolist (say, du Pont circa 1947) should truthfully answer “no” to the 
question, “Could you profitably raise your price by 5% and sustain it for a year?” 
There are, however, limited circumstances in which the Merger Guidelines 
paradigm could be used for market definition purposes in monopolization cases.  First, the 
SSNIP test could be useful for defining the market in monopolization cases in which a 
defendant’s proposed monopolization practice (e.g., some exclusionary measure) has been 
stayed by an injunction and defendants have not already obtained and exploited market 
power.50  In that context, the SSNIP test properly defines a market in which market power 
could be exercised, and then the remainder of the case could focus on whether the 
defendant's proposed practice would likely create or enhance market power (and whether 
there are offsetting efficiencies, etc.). 
Second, the results of a SSNIP test used in an earlier a merger case might be used in 
a subsequent monopolization case that involves the same products and geographic areas and 
that follows shortly after the merger analysis (so that structural changes are unlikely to have 
occurred that could have changed the dimensions of the relevant market).  Let us offer as an 
example a hypothetical follow-on to the real-life Staples-Office Depot merger case.51  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, accessible at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11254.htm; David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate, & Louis Silva, 20 Years of 
Merger Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective, accessible at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11255.htm; Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent 
of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, accessible at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11256.htm; Oliver 
E. Williamson, The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice -- In Perspective, accessible at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11254.htm. 
50 This point is made by Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly 
Cases and Alternative Approaches, 16 REV. IND. ORG.. 211 (2000). 
51 For discussions of the Staples-Office Depot case, see Serdar Dalkir & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Prices, 
Market Definition, and the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot (1997), in John E. Kwoka, Jr., & Lawrence 
J. White, eds., THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY, 4th edn. 152 (2004); 
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crucial argument in that case was the FTC’s position (followed and supported by a district 
court opinion52) that office super stores (OSSs) in metropolitan areas were a relevant market 
for analyzing the proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot.  The FTC argued (as was 
suggested by simple price comparisons, more refined econometric analyses, and the 
company documents of the merging parties) that prices for office products at Staples and 
Office Depot stores were highest in metropolitan areas where only one OSS chain had 
stores, second highest where two OSS chains53 had stores, and lowest where all three OSS 
chains had stores.54  In essence, metropolitan OSSs were a market in which market power 
could be (and in some markets had been) exercised.55
Suppose that, subsequently, an OSS entrant into a specific metropolitan area, where 
only a single OSS chain (say, Staples) was present, claimed that Staples had deliberately 
acquired all of the suitable sites at which an OSS could be located, thereby excluding the 
entrant.  The threshold question -- are metropolitan OSSs the relevant market? -- has already 
been answered in the affirmative by the FTC in the Staples-Office Depot case, from the 
cross-section price evidence.56  And, by assumption, Staples is the only OSS in the specific 
market in question.  The case could then proceed to the questions of whether Staple’s 
actions were in fact exclusionary, what effects they had, and whether there were offsetting 
efficiency gains. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18 J. PUB. POL. MARKETING 11 (1999); Lawrence 
J. White, Staples-Office Depot and UP-SP: An Antitrust Tale of Two Proposed Mergers, in Daniel J. Slottje, 
ed., MEASURING MARKET POWER 153 (2002); and Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Documents 
versus Econometrics in Staples (no date), accessible at http://www.antitrust.org/cases/staples/hausleon.html. 
52 Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (1997). 
53 Office Max was and is the third significant OSS chain. 
54 For a contrary view, see Hausman & Leonard, supra note 51. 
55 The FTC also found that prices fell when there was entry by a new brand of OSS into a metropolitan area 
that had previously had only a single brand of OSS. 
56 Equivalently, of course, the plaintiff could collect the same cross-section pricing data, conduct its own 
statistical analysis, and (presumably) reach the same conclusion. 
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But most monopolization cases do not provide settings that allow either of these two 
uses of the SSNIP test.  Consequently, an alternative approach is required. 
We now turn to our proposal. 
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V. A Proposed SSNDP Test for Monopolization Cases
 
A. The proposal. 
Suppose that company P (Plaintiff) sues company D (Defendant), claiming that D's 
exclusionary practices57 have prevented P from competing.58  We propose a two-stage 
procedure for determining whether D’s actions had a significant anticompetitive effect: 
1) Estimate what P's “but for” output59 would have been in the absence of D’s 
practices.60
2) Ask whether P’s “but for” additional output would have caused a “small but 
significant nontransitory decrease in the price” that D would have charged.61
                                                 
57  Our proposal can be used to analyze other types of monopolization cases besides cases involving 
exclusionary practices.   
58 Or a government agency could be the plaintiff, claiming that there are one or more P's that have been 
excluded. 
59 Proper consideration of this matter should include not only the specific firm P that is bringing the suit but also 
any other similarly situated firms that would have been affected by D’s actions.  With respect to P, it may be 
important to consider its long-run output; otherwise, D may be able to undertake actions that foreclose a 
foothold entrant that would have been able to increase its market share over time or a somewhat larger firm that 
would have had an even more substantial effect on price (e.g., under the entry standard in §3.4 of the DOJ 
Guidelines, the firm would have had been large enough to have a “sufficient” effect to discipline the market).  
This caveat is required because the entry (non-foreclosure) of a fringe firm by the monopolist may not (by 
itself) have a significant effect on price, even though the monopolist has market power in a well-defined market 
and is undertaking conduct that has anticompetitive effects.  Similarly, it may be the case that a non-foreclosed 
P could have matured into a significant challenger to D, even if it initially is small at the time of the alleged 
exclusion.  Again, it is important to take into account this long-run view of P’s output.  As a result, our 
discussion in this section encompasses this broader view of “P.”  Given this, an interesting and important issue, 
is how to account for the “reputation” effect that D’s actions might have on future P’s that may not be currently 
identifiable.  This issue was explicitly raised in U.S. v. AMR et al., 140 F.Supp. 2d 1141 (2001); 335 F.3d 1109 
(2003).  For a discussion, see Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A Chance to 
Clarify Predation Policy (2001) , in Lawrence J. White & John E. Kwoka, Jr., eds., THE ANTITRUST 
REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY, 4th edn. 502 (2004). 
60 In some markets, such as bid markets, it may be impractical to estimate market shares or a specific “but 
for” output for P.  In such instances, the two-part test can be modified to ask the following: 1) What would 
P’s long-run competitive capabilities have been? 2) Would P’s unconstrained presence have caused a 
“small but significant decrease in the price” that D would have charged?”  In some cases, these price 
effects may be reflected in the failure to develop and/or offer improved products that would have been 
marketed if P had not been foreclosed and D faced competition from P. 
61 This decrease in price may be in a related market, as has been argued would have been true in the Microsoft 
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The combination of the two stages can be described as a “SSNDP” test.  The same 
magnitudes as typically apply to the Merger Guidelines' SSNIP test seem reasonable: e.g., a 
5% decrease, sustained for at least one year. 
If the answer to stage 2 is “yes,” then D’s actions are likely to have had an 
anticompetitive effect.  Explicit in this result is the conclusion that D likely possesses market 
power (and exercised it vis-à-vis P).62  Implicit is the conclusion that there is a relevant 
market within which D could exercise that market power, although our SSNDP test does not 
explicitly delineate that market, nor does it require that a market be defined.63
We will address infra some cautionary restraints that we believe are important in 
interpreting “yes” answers.  But one is so important that we wish to address it here:  
Suppose that an entrant, perhaps through overly optimistic miscalculation, adds substantial 
capacity to a competitive market, driving prices below sustainable equilibrium levels.  The 
entrant may be the weakest firm in this situation and may exit.64  In any event, it sues one or 
more of the incumbents, charging that their decreased prices in response to its entry are 
exclusionary (predatory) and anticompetitive.  It may well be the case that the entrant’s 
effects on one or more of the incumbents would be such that the SSNDP test would be 
answered “yes.”  Nevertheless, so long as the defendant can demonstrate that its actions 
                                                                                                                                                 
case, where Microsoft'’s actions in “making life difficult” for Netscape in its sales of browsers were primarily 
intended to protect Microsoft's market power in its Windows operating system.  In some cases, such as those 
involving differentiated products, it may be necessary to consider whether D might implement a strategy of 
maintaining monopoly prices for infra-marginal customers, while allowing marginal customers to move to P.  
As a result, the test can require consideration of whether the prices paid would have been lower for some of D’s 
former or potential customers, even though D would not have lowered prices itself. 
62 There may still be exonerating circumstances that would allow D to avoid being found guilty of 
monopolization -- e.g., D’s actions had sufficiently large efficiencies. 
63 It may be possible to identify other firms that are in the relevant market by considering what firms and 
products are substitutes for D’s and P’s products at the lower price that would have resulted from P’s 
unforeclosed output.  But see our discussion infra of an apparently competitive firm that nevertheless can 
exercise significant exclusionary market power vis-à-vis an entrant. 
64 When incumbents use non-price strategies to foreclose an entrant, one must consider whether the 
entrant’s exit is attributable to the incumbent’s non-price strategy. 
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were not specifically targeted at the entrant – i.e., that it was reacting to market conditions, 
and that the profitability of its response was not predicated on its expectation of the demise 
of the entrant65 -- the defendant(s) should not be found guilty of an antitrust violation. 
Returning to the general application of the SSNDP test, we believe that if the answer 
to stage 2 is “no,” then D’s actions are deemed not to have had an anticompetitive effect.  
This could occur for at least two reasons:  At stage 1, D’s actions could be found to have had 
little or no effect on P's "but for" output -- e.g., because D’s actions were not truly 
exclusionary, or because P’s output would have declined anyway because of other 
circumstances (e.g., P’s own managerial difficulties).  At stage 2, the “but for” additional 
output66 from stage 1 could have had little effect on D's price because perceived actual and 
potential competitors have kept prices at competitive levels or because the additional output 
is so small relative to the sum of the output of D and of the other firms that produce 
commodities that are similar or identical to D’s that again the price consequences are de 
minimus.67  Note that with respect to this “no” answer we do not reach any conclusion as to 
whether D has market power68 or with respect to a delineation of the market boundaries.  
However, we do not need to do so, since the absence of an anticompetitive effect answers 
the question that needs answering.69  
                                                 
65 These are the criteria suggested by Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of 
Predation: Product and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L. J. 8 (1981).  These criteria have been raised anew 
in the American Airlines case, 140 F.Supp. 2d 1141 (2001); 335 F.3d 1109 (2003); see Edlin & Farrell, 
supra  note 59. 
66 We again emphasize, however, that it is P’s long-run unforeclosed output that should be used for the 
SSNDP test. 
67 On this last point, P’s “but for” additional output might make little difference in a very large market, or it 
might be absorbed through output reductions by one or more incumbents. 
68 Despite the absence of a price effect with respect to P and its “but for” output, firm D might nevertheless 
have market power in the traditional sense of Figure 1, supra Section II.  For example, while P did not affect 
prices, this may be because P’s product was not close enough of a substitute, leaving open the possibility that D 
has market power because it faces no close substitutes. 
69 There is no anticompetitive effect since there was no effect on price or on other indicia of market 
performance. 
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Our SSNDP test is exclusively a price-effects test, and not a test of quantity effects, 
for an important reason:  We want to avoid overly broad attributions of anticompetitive 
effects.  For example, suppose that P’s “but for” output addition would have been absorbed 
by reductions in output by one or more incumbent firms.  This is what we would expect to 
observe in a competitive market with a highly elastic industry supply curve.  We see little 
competitive harm from P's exclusion in most circumstances70 and thus would be reluctant to 
label the outcome “anticompetitive” and implicitly to identify incumbents with the exercise 
of market power. 
By contrast, suppose that D is one among a handful of firms who sell similar or 
identical items, all of whom behave as price takers, and D’s exclusionary practices are found 
to have had a sufficiently large effect on P that our SSNDP test is answered with a “yes.”  In 
this case, even though we might have identified D and its rivals as “competitive” prior to 
D’s actions vis-à-vis P, the fact that D’s exclusionary practices did have significant price 
consequences71 is an indication that, at least with respect to preventing a rival’s expansion 
(and whose expansion would have had a significant effect on price), D has behaved 
anticompetitively -- and in this respect exercised market power.72
                                                 
70 We recognize that, even with no price effect, the exclusion of P would mean the loss of any producer's 
surplus that P might have earned in the "but for" scenario and that this forgone surplus might be greater than the 
actual surplus earned by an incumbent on the equivalent output.  But we see no way of practicably measuring 
and taking this net loss of surplus into account.  Also, it is possible that one or more colluding incumbents in an 
explicit or implicit cartel would have accommodated P’s additional output by decreasing their own output 
rather than cutting price and risking a destabilization of their arrangement.  Here the incumbents do have 
market power, which would be ignored by our focus on price effects.  By using a broad definition of P’s “but 
for” output, see note 59 supra, we have attempted to address the possibility that a dominant firm or group 
of collusive firms may accommodate the entrant by reducing output sufficiently to sustain the monopoly 
price.  Absent this consideration, the price effect would be understated, and/or exclusionary behavior that 
eliminated toehold entrants would be missed. 
71 This could be true if entry is difficult and if D and all of its rivals have supply curves (marginal costs) that are 
rising significantly. 
72 This is an example of Krattenmaker, Lande, & Salop’s phenomenon, footnote 4 supra, of a competitive 
firm’s being able to use exclusionary practices to acquire market power.  For example, consider a group of 
competitors that control a standard setting organization.  While these firms may compete with respect to the 
supply of “old widgets,” they may use their control over the standard setting organization to prevent entry 
by a supplier of “new widgets.”  When entry by the “new widget” manufacturer would lower old widget 
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 B. Some applications. 
We can suggest some (in principle) applications of our SSNDP test to a few recent 
major monopolization cases.  We will describe these applications from the perspective of 
how the plaintiff might have argued its case with the use of the SSNDP test.73
1. U.S. v. Microsoft.74  In the absence of Microsoft’s actions that “made life 
difficult” for Netscape, Netscape’s expanded presence (plus Sun Microsystem’s Java 
programming language) would have caused Microsoft to have charged a significantly lower 
price for its Windows operating system. 
2. U.S. v. AMR et al..75  In the absence of American Airlines’ flight capacity 
expansions on the city-pair routes that had been entered by Vanguard, Western Pacific, and 
SunJet, these entrants' continued presence on these routes would have caused American to 
have charged significantly lower fares. 
3. U.S. v. Visa & MasterCard.76  (a) In the absence of the two credit card networks' 
prohibitions on their members' issuance of the cards of any other network, Discover and 
American Express (and possibly other networks) could have expanded their card issuances, 
which would have caused Visa and MasterCard to have reduced their fees and to have 
offered additional features (which would effectively have meant a holding-quality-constant 
price reduction).  (b) In the absence of the governance structures of the two networks (which 
                                                                                                                                                 
prices, perhaps even forcing “old widgets” from the market, the old widget manufacturers have market 
power, which they exercise when they foreclose entry.  Similarly, control over an essential facility by one 
or more incumbent widget suppliers, which allows them to deter the introduction of new widgets, could 
have this same price effect and thus evidence market power. 
73 We are not necessarily endorsing these plaintiffs’ perspectives. 
74 253 F.3d 34 (2001). 
75 140 F.Supp. 2d 1141 (2001); 335 F.3d 1109 (2003). 
76 163 F.Supp. 2d. 322 (2001); 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19281. 
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allowed major issuers of credit cards in one network to be on the board of directors of the 
other network), innovation in credit cards would have been more rapid (which, again, would 
have meant a holding-quality-constant price reduction). 
4. Wal-Mart et al. v. Visa & MasterCard.77  In the absence of Visa and MasterCard’s 
insistence that retailers must accept all payment cards that have their respective logos, the 
two networks would have faced more competition in debit cards and would have 
significantly reduced their fees associated with their off-line debit cards. 
5. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C.78  In the absence of Toys “R” Us’s restraints on toy 
manufacturers’ sales of toys to warehouse clubs, warehouse clubs would have had larger 
sales and Toys “R” Us’s prices for those toys would have been significantly lower. 
 
C. Some Issues
1. The Chamberlin/Robinson competitor.  Any monopolization test cannot avoid the 
issue of how to deal with the distinct seller who faces a downward sloping demand curve 
but who does not exercise significant market power (i.e., a Chamberlin/Robinson 
competitor) -- but who may be sued and charged with exclusionary behavior.  As a concrete 
but hypothetical example, imagine that Sam, the owner of Sam’s Corner Delicatessen, 
convinces his departing general manager Nora, to sign a “no compete” contract before she 
leaves.  Immediately after cashing her severance check, however, Nora sues Sam, arguing 
that the contract should be voided, because it is exclusionary and anticompetitive.  Even if 
Nora's Mid-Block Eatery could have caused Sam to drop his prices by more than 5%, it 
doesn’t mean that this contract was anticompetitive.  For example, it would not be 
anticompetitive if there are other equally well-positioned entrants that can cause the same 
price effect. 
                                                 
77 280 F.3d 124 (2001). 
78 221 F.3d 928 (2000). 
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2. Innovation.  It is possible that the excluded firm P would have been an innovator, 
producing items that would have taken sales away from D, not by itself but in combination 
with other innovative products.  Nevertheless, our SSNDP test is likely to reach a sensible 
conclusion.  If D's practices were intended to inhibit P’s innovation, then it is likely that D 
feared P’s direct or indirect competition and the consequences for D’s prices.79
3. Exclusionary reputation.  As we briefly mentioned in footnote 59 supra, our 
SSNDP test might find that firm P had been excluded but that it was too small to have 
otherwise precipitated a 5% price decrease from D.80  Nevertheless, D’s exclusionary 
actions may earn it a reputation, which would deter future P’s (who are currently not 
identifiable) from even coming forward.  As courts have recognized, this can be a difficult 
empirical question for monopolization tests (see e.g., U.S. v. AMR et al., 140 F.Supp. 2d 
1141 (2001); 335 F.3d 1109 (2003)). 
4. An absence of exclusion?  Suppose that an enforcement agency were to bring a 
“pure” structural case, with no allegations of exclusionary conduct, against firm D.81  For 
example, a case could involve allegations of collusive behavior, including the adoption of 
facilitating practices.  Although rare, such cases have been brought.82  For such cases, our 
                                                 
79 The same logic would apply if D was a full-service seller and X was a discounter or industry maverick. 
80 We have addressed this problem by defining “P’s output” to include the output of other similarly situated 
firms that would have been affected by D’s actions. 
81 However, past government "structural" cases have usually included allegations of excluded parties.  For 
example, in the Cellophane case the government alleged that du Pont had discouraged other firms from 
entering into the production of cellophane; see 351 U.S. 377, 425 (1956).  In Alcoa, the government argued that 
Alcoa had preemptively gained control of crucial inputs, such as hydro power sites and bauxite supplies; see 
U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America et al., 148 F.2d 416 (1945); and Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209 (1986); but 
see also John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek, Another Look at Alcoa: Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the 
View, 35 J. L. ECON. 311 (1992).  Similar allegations were raised in U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
110 F. Supp. 295 (1953); see also Carl Kaysen, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956). 
82 See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (1984).  For a discussion, see George A. 
Hay, Facilitating Practices: The Ethyl Case (1984) in John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, eds. THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY, 3rd edn., 182 (1999). 
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SSNDP test could be modified to ask what the price effect would be if another firm that 
produced the same product as D entered and behaved competitively. 
5. Empirical support.  We recognize that our SSNDP test requires two levels of 
empirical support.  First, the “but for” output of P must be estimated;83 then the consequence 
for D's prices84 of P’s “but for” additional output must also be estimated.  Both of these 
stages involve investigations of the counterfactual and thus pose difficult empirical 
questions.85  However, two decades ago, after the introduction of the SSNIP paradigm for 
merger analysis, some commentators expressed concerns about the ability of the SSNIP 
paradigm to be supported by empirical evidence.  As proved to be the case for the SSNIP 
paradigm, the point of developing a paradigm of this type is to make sure that the right 
questions are being asked so that all available evidence can be brought to bear on a central 
issue.  Moreover, as has been true for the SSNIP test, once the right paradigm is in place, 
economists are better able to focus their talents on developing ways of measuring the critical 
elasticities and loss ratios that underlie the key economic relationships that define the market 
and determine if a firm or group of firms have market power in that market.   
                                                 
83 As explained above, alternatively P’s “but for” competitive significance must be evaluated. 
84 As is conventional in this type of discussion, this assumes the anticompetitive effects are limited to 
prices.  As pointed out above, anticompetitive effects may also take the form of a reduction in the quality of 
the product offerings at a given price. 
85 We are especially wary of the tendency of excluded firms to make liberal estimates of their "but for" output.  
For a critique of one such instance, see Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Resale Price Maintenance Reexamined: 
Monsanto v. Spray-Rite, in John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, eds., THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: 




The current absence of a common paradigm for market definition and the 
identification of market power in monopolization cases is a serious problem for modern 
antitrust.  Absent a paradigm that is similar to the SSNIP paradigm that is used in merger 
analysis, economists and jurists are prone to re-committing the “cellophane fallacy” or 
otherwise making ad hoc assumptions to achieve a specific result. 
To address this problem we propose a SSNDP test:  If firm P claims to have been the 
victim of D's exclusionary practices, what would P’s output have been in the “but for” world 
of the absence of these practices and would P's additional output have caused a “small but 
significant nontransitory decrease in the price” that D would have charged?  This SSNDP 
test provides indirect inferences as to the delineation of the relevant market and, more 
importantly, allows one to focus directly on the likely anticompetitive effects of D's actions 
and thereby on the exercise of market power. 
We believe that our SSNDP test can be implemented empirically and represents a 
way, comparable to the SSNIP test of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, of providing 
traction for this important starting point in monopolization cases. 
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Figure 1: A Comparison of Monopoly and Competition
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